Introduction
It is a major challenge in US Treasury debt management to communicate the stance and implications of current and contemplated debt-issuance actionably yet concisely. A complex, operationallyintensive policy that currently involves over 250 regular auctions of 14 security types annually, in various sizes and patterns totaling (as of 2017) almost $4 trillion in total borrowing (here defined as net new debt plus refinancing of prior-year debt), must be apprehended by strategists and advisors when considering what shall be done and describing the expected result. Discussants must summarize their views and findings in a common language, and also in a way that aligns with and informs the practical, on-the-ground decision points that policy makers actually control.
Similarly, while there is a consensus to ensure that decisions be informed by (often quite complex) quantitative models and simulations created by researchers, it is no small task to bridge the gap between the product of such models and the tangible needs of and constraints on debt managers. What is needed is to align theory and numerical metrics with how the path of debt issuance is envisioned, discussed, and navigated by practitioners.
The purpose of this paper is to motivate and describe strategy metrics that help meet this need. These metrics and the model behind them are derived from simple and intuitive reasoning about the long-term, asymptotic implications of ongoing debt issuance in a steady-state environment. Because of the numerous simplifying assumptions required to render such a calculation coherent and well-defined, the underlying model is best understood as a complement to, and not a substitute for, the near-and medium-term debt simulation and optimization efforts more commonly found in the literature.
By mapping issuance strategies according to these metrics, which (abstractly) represent cost and risk respectively, one can trace the evolution of Treasury issuance historically, identify an analogue of the efficient frontier, and gauge the likely impact of anticipated changes to the prevailing issuance pattern. These visualizations can also be done on a forward-looking basis, and are based on the flow of new-issuance rather than the outstanding stock. The resulting strategy metrics, and visualizations based on them, can therefore help to summarize and illuminate Treasury issuance * The author is with the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Debt Management. The analysis and conclusions set forth in this paper are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of or indicate concurrence by other members of the Treasury staff, Treasury's senior officials, the Treasury Department, or the United States government. strategy in ways that aid debt managers in their decisions in a way that is aligned with how those decisions are contemplated.
Motivation
In this section we describe same motivation for the development and usage of these metrics in visualizing Treasury issuance strategy.
Escaping WAM
The communication challenge described above is best exemplified by the pervasiveness of a single, high-level summary metric whenever discussion of debt management turns quantitative. This is the weighted-average maturity (WAM) of the outstanding portfolio. Often, this metric is taken to serve as a simultaneous proxy for both cost and risk: all else equal, a portfolio with a high WAM would be expected to have high debt-servicing cost, and low risk (however measured, whether in terms of rollover amounts, debt-servicing cost volatility, or other similar metrics).
It is true that the WAM of a portfolio can serve as useful and intuitive shorthand for both its cost and risk implications over time. The quantity is straightforward, transparently modelfree for anyone to compute, and can be done so using public data. Yet all recognize that it has inherent shortcomings. For example, a "barbelled" portfolio composed of half 1-day and half 30year bonds has essentially the same WAM as a portfolio containing only 15-year bonds, but very different rollover and risk implications. (In this extreme example, half of the former portfolio will need to be refinanced in one day.) Similarly, the WAM of the US Treasury portfolio, which is at or near modern-day highs (see Figure 1 ), largely reflects increased issuance flow (in both size and frequency) of longer-dated borrowing (7-and 10-year notes, and 30-year bonds) that began near the beginning of this decade. The resulting WAM of around 70 months is a consequence of disproportionately adding these longer-dated bonds to the portfolio (closely following the 2001-2006 discontinuation of 30-year issues), which can be seen to have a marked "hole" near maturities of around 15 to 20 years. (See Figure 2 .) But WAM masks the fine-grained details of a maturity profile, and to discuss debt management in terms of managing the portfolio WAM leads to oversimplification of what is in reality a dynamic, evolving process that is highly influenced by historical issuance patterns.
An added, less well appreciated observation is that WAM is a stock measure (describing, after all, the outstanding portfolio). Although such a proxy does fit with a rich literature in sovereign debt issuance modeling that addresses the optimal distribution of stock, in practice Treasury debt management choices and decisions (absent a significant buyback program) have a more direct effect not on stock but on flow. That is, under current policy it is (largely) the makeup and sizing of the regular, ongoing supply of new issuance that is under the direct control of the US Treasury. This mismatch, between control variables and ostensible target metrics, can make certain statements and concepts phrased in terms of WAM misleading.
For example, consider a hypothetical strategy of using only 5-year issuance: this might sometimes be interpreted and spoken of (loosely) as using a "5 year WAM" strategy. But regular, periodic issuance of 5-year debt does not create a portfolio with a 5-year WAM (the actual WAM of the resulting portfolio would likely range between 2.5-3 years, and fluctuate with deficits). See Figure 3 for an illustration, which shows why this occurs and why there is a meaningful difference between the maturity of new-issuance and the WAM of the resulting portfolio. It also illustrates Here the current-face of each security is scaled by its remaining maturity (in months) and divided by the total size of the portfolio; the resulting quantities, having units of months, are then aggregated by maturity bucket. The sum of the column heights in the chart is the WAM itself. This visualization illustrates that the Treasury portfolio is essentially bifurcated into two distinct portfolios rather than uniformly allocated. The shorter (≤ 15 years) portion of the portfolio has a WAM of around 33 months, but the longer (20+ years) portion of the portfolio serves to boost WAM to its elevated level (approximately 71 months). All quantities as of end Q3 FY2017. that considering and managing the maturity of new debt does not necessarily result in a predictable WAM, which can and will be affected by fluctuations in deficits and rates. (Conversely, managing to a particular WAM would require allowing new issuance to fluctuate with deficits and rates.)
As of 2017, the Treasury portfolio has a WAM of almost 6 years (far longer than 3), issues at an average maturity of around 3.5-4 years (shorter than 5) and with a median maturity that is even shorter, at around 3 years. How then to translate a statement about something as simple as all-5-year issuance into the language of WAM? How to interpret its implications, or even speak about new-issuance allocation at all, when it is WAM that is the lingua franca of debt management? Managing debt flow but measuring and tracking WAM becomes a regular source of miscommunication. Figure 3 : Example of a hypothetical portfolio created by issuing only 5y debt yearly, spread throughout each year, in the face of rising and randomly-fluctuating deficits. The average maturity of a series of 5y notes with the same size spread over five years would be 2.5 years, but because deficits grow and fluctuate, the actual WAM of such a portfolio would fluctuate too, and likely be in the 2.5-3 year range.
The truth is that despite these drawbacks, and however aware debt managers are of them and attempt to move beyond undue focus on WAM, its simplicity and ubiquity -and, importantly, the lack of alternatives -makes it too useful not to revert to as a strategy metric and shorthand, a common reference point for communicating strategy.
Flow and the cost-risk tradeoff
As stated above, this piece describes an effort undertaken to improve this situation by summarizing and visualizing Treasury issuance in a way that, while it preserves much of the simplicity and transparency advantages of WAM, is more aligned with the dynamic and flow-centered nature of practical debt management and its tradeoffs. We do this by associating to any given issuance pattern or set of sizes two proxy metrics, one abstractly corresponding to cost and the other to risk. An issuance strategy or pattern is thereby represented as a point in a cost-versus-risk space (i.e., risk-return but from the issuer perspective). As patterns change or issue sizes are adjusted, the implied cost-risk tradeoff changes. By plotting the trajectory over time, one can illustrate the path of Treasury debt management either historically, or in a given projected scenario. The resulting graph in cost-versus-risk space allows for visualization of debt-management strategy directions and movements in a way that harnesses intuitions and stylized facts from classical portfolio theory and efficient frontiers.
Often, scenario analysis in Treasury debt management involves charting out and considering a future path of issue-sizes over a planning period (for example, 10 years). With over 250 auctions per year, in the most general of such constructs there would be at least 2500 independent control variables to consider. Simplification is inevitable. But even if planned representative issue-sizes in a forward planning period are (for example) stipulated to be constant yearly, with 14 security types this still creates 140 independent variables. Further reduction of the dimension of this problem is necessary to comprehensible scenario analysis or consideration of the impacts of a particular issuance strategy shift.
Practically speaking, then, scenario analysis largely confines itself to consideration of high-level, easily-comprehended strategy directions. To illustrate, suppose projected funding requirements compel Treasury to increase borrowing patterns versus status quo. Various groupings of instruments, and/or tenor categories, may be considered, such as: increasing bill sizes pro rata, increase coupon-bond sizes pro rata, twist short (so that short-tenor instrument sizes are increased faster than for long tenors), twist long, "barbell" (e.g. increase the very short and very long tenors, against the medium tenors), and so forth. The time dimension involved in forward planning only complicates matters, because (unlike with, say, equity allocation) the question is not how to allocate "right now" but how to do so over time. And allocation is dynamic; it can and does change over time.
What follows can be conceived of as an alternative approach to reduced-form modeling and scenario analysis of this type, one that attempts to capture the salient features and expected longterm dynamics of more complex quantitative models (e.g. Monte Carlo methods that estimate a steady-state portfolio given market and strategy assumptions) that are, unavoidably, several orders of magnitude more computationally intensive. It is also a goal to obviate the need to focus on specific dollar issue sizes along finely-calibrated forward market paths, and instead bring relative allocation and borrowing fractions to the forefront of strategic consideration.
Alternatively, and less ambitiously, this piece merely presents simple cost and risk proxy metrics relevant to and useful in visualizing issuance strategy, in the context of and as an adjunct to what is, in the abstract, a complex optimal stochastic control problem (for examples of the latter we can refer the reader to e.g. [6] , [10] , [12] ). The next section gives definitions necessary to understanding of those metrics.
Definitions
This section describes definitions and mathematical constructs required for the metrics we introduce. The starting point is the government's periodwise budget equation, which (aside from, possibly, notation) is standard and does not depart from e.g. [3] .
Time is discretized into periods, which we will take to be (fiscal) years. In each year t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , dollar outlays are made from the Treasury General Account (TGA) broadly owing to three sources:
• The difference (a deficit, D t ) between fiscal spending and tax receipts. (This may or may not coincide with "primary deficit", as it includes all (non-interest) spending items that may necessitate debt financing including e.g. student loans.)
• Interest payments on debt, I t
• Repayment of maturing debt principal, M t
To ensure that these outlays do not add to the money stock (a phenomenon that would register as a reduction in the TGA balance) they must be offset by dollar inflows. This is achieved by issuing new debt in an amount N t sufficient to generate the required cash proceeds. Assume for simplicity that the TGA balance is held constant 1 year over year. We therefore must have
where N t is the face notional amount to be issued in year t. (Here issuance is assumed to be at par; any issuance discount is assumed to be contained in I t .) More generally, the case where the TGA balance is not constant but rises over time could be addressed, by (for example) including cash-balance changes into the deficit term D t ; as long as cash-balance grows at a rate no faster than do deficits, the below analysis is unaffected. Assume all debt can be issued in one of several tenors j ∈ (1, 2, . . . , T ). Note here all Treasury bills are to be lumped into the j = 1 bucket; for simplicity the interest on 1-year debt in year t is assumed due in year t + 1. (As well, the inflation component of TIPS and the floating coupons of FRNs are ignored in this construct; where necessary they are lumped in with their nominal counterparts by tenor.)
For our purposes here, an issuance strategy is assumed to consist of selecting constant fractions f j a priori that govern how much of each tenor to issue. That is, in year t Treasury will issue at tenor j the amount
Obviously the assumption that real-world issuance strategy is described by a set of flow fractions is debatable. In practice, modern Treasury issuance practice has historically been stated and managed in terms of the auction sizes (in nominal dollar terms) of its regular notes and bonds. When necessary, changes to those sizes may be considered going forward. The resulting issuance process has, consequently, often been characterized by punctuated periods during which nominal sizes (and not issuance-fractions) of tenors have remained steady, unless and until changed. This is done in a deliberate manner in keeping with Treasury's philosophy of "regular and predictable" issuance. Clearly, the (empirical) issuance fractions that result from such a process need not be (and have not been, historically) constant or steady. However, it will be seen that as an approximation to the actual process over long periods, and as a description of the stance of issuance allocation (as regards its long-term implications), this fractional model will suffice for our purposes.
Because I t and M t depend on N s,j for s ≥ t − T , equation 3.1 is a T -period recursive difference equation for the yearly vectors of new-issue sizes (N t,j ) T j=1 , in which deficits D t play the role of an exogenous forcing term, one that is presumably unrelated to debt management policy as such.
One gauge of the cost of this issuance strategy is just its new-issue weighted average maturity (NWAM); if measured in years, this quantity can be immediately read off of the issuance fractions f j via the formula
The 1/2 term here adjusts for the fact that Treasury issuance is typically spread throughout a year.)
In a sense this is the flow equivalent of WAM. This metric itself can provide useful insights into debt management policy. For example, during the period 2010-16 Treasury WAM steadily increased, which has been characterized as a policy of "actively" increasing WAM. But it may be more descriptive to say merely that Treasury used a very stable and unchanging new-issuance pattern, and that pattern had a longer-tenor bias. This is illustrated by the relatively flat NWAM throughout the period. (See Figure 4 .) The reason WAM increased as a result is that the issuance pattern Treasury set in place in 2010-11, and then left largely unchanged, was long-biased (had a high NWAM of 45-50 months) compared to historical practice and to the (lower) breakeven NWAM that would have maintained the length of the outstanding portfolio at its then-extant level. 
Steady asymptotic limit
How is the recursion (3.2) used to derive cost and risk proxies? What we seek is to characterize the long-term implications of using a given strategy, as described by the issuance fractions f j . Conceptually, we would like to think of the portfolio as being in (in some sense) a "steady-state", so that we may ask questions about how current issuance affects or causes the portfolio to drift toward that steady-state. This long-term, steady-state-centered point of view is meant to be the logical extension of a common modeling approach in which a portfolio, under some issuance strategy assumption, is simulated for a long period of time (10, 20 years or more) and then the resulting metrics are averaged and examined at the horizon or in an abstract future period (cf. [6] ).
Granted, it is not obvious that such a steady-state can or does exist. In practice, fiscal deficits and interest rates fluctuate in a correlated and possibly secular manner; issuance tenors and strategies, meanwhile, can change. The Treasury portfolio historically shows little signs of ever having converged to a steady-state per se. As well, nominal quantities all grow over time, restricting the possible quantities that can even be said to be steady or homogeneities that may exist. A model with the ambition of calculating and describing the "steady-state", longterm consequence of an issuance strategy evidently must be abstract and hypothetical in nature. Simplifying assumptions must be made.
Here, we make two major assumptions:
• Deficits grow geometrically at a constant rate of g per year (D t ∼ (1 + g) t ).
• The yield curve (interest rates r j , j = 1, . . . , T ) is static and constant yearly.
The reader will object that the above are unrealistically simplified assumptions; they are better conceived of as representing long-term averages around which a real market-data path might plausibly fluctuate and to which it might mean-revert.
The motivation for these assumptions is precisely that these appear to be the conditions necessary for a rolling Treasury portfolio to become self-similar and approach a meaningful "steadystate" as t → ∞. Indeed, under these assumptions we can solve for the long-term asymptotic equilibrium portfolio of equation (3.2) and observe its properties and metrics. In the below, we highlight two such metrics that naturally represent this asymptotic steady-state portfolio as regards its cost and risk.
Cost proxy
Under appropriate and historically plausible conditions on r and g, we show in Appendix A.2 that the effective interest-cost percentage, or (to abuse terminology slightly, given our approximation of discount bills as 1-period coupon bonds) weighted-average coupon (WAC) of the portfolio under the strategy f (defined as W AC t = I t /z t−1 , where z · represents the total debt stock) approaches a constant asymptotic limit
where w j are weights that depend only on f and g (not on r):
In essence w j are compounded and growth-adjusted new-issue fractions. They represent the implication that using issuance strategy f has for interest cost -how using allocation f , in effect, "samples the yield curve" in the long haul.
The weights w j are adjustments of the new-issue fractions f j . Note that for g > 0 the adjustment (downward) is larger for short tenors than for longer tenors. This reflects the fact that longer-tenor interest rates play a larger role in portfolio WAC when the portfolio is dominated by recent issuance and (consequently) recently-issued longer bonds are present as a significant component of stock. That is precisely the situation when deficit growth g is positive and large: recent issuance is more prominent.
The quantity W AC * = W AC * (f ; g, r) serves as a cost indicator of using issuance strategy f . Obviously it is not intended as a true calculation of the cost either "right now" or on any particular path; rather, it is a gauge of the expected long-term, structural cost (asymptotically) if the strategy is to be maintained, and if near-term fluctuations in deficits and rates are neglected. But given that Treasury subscribes to a philosophy of "regular and predictable" issuance, and does not attempt to time the market, in our view it is the precisely this long-term asymptotic expectation that is the proper orientation when it comes to a high-level cost assessment.
Of course, W AC * also depends strongly on the particular asymptotic rate assumption r. To remove this dependence, we calculate a quantity representing a "WAC-effective" tenor:
Higher/lower values of t W AC should be associated with higher/lower cost, all else equal (and assuming an upward-sloping and relatively-smooth yield curve r). This makes t W AC -which is effectively a variant of NWAM, but using compounded and growth-adjusted weights w rather than the issuance fractions f -a useful rate-assumption-free cost proxy for issuance strategy f .
Risk proxy
Opinions and choices vary on how to gauge risk in debt-management. One can find in regular use as risk metrics the stochastic variance (i.e. uncertainty, whether conditional or unconditional) of interest-cost, the variability of interest-cost one can expect to observe unfolding over time, and measures of interest cost such as Cost-at-Risk (CaR) and variants that are based on the tails of the distribution of outcomes (examples for some/all of these can be found in, for example, [1] , [2] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [18] ). There is also a growing view that the focus of cost quantification ought to be the primary balance (or total deficit) rather than interest cost in isolation (cf. [4] , [16] , [18] ). Some sovereigns also place exogenous bounds on simple gross quantities such as required auction sizes, gross interest cost, or Debt/GDP ; these too, where applicable, serve as risk constraints. Without taking specific a view on the matter, we simply observe that arguably, any/all of these are dependent on and correlated with a simple quantity, the yearly maturing amount (i.e., rollover fraction). After all, the higher a percentage of the portfolio that must be rolled yearly,
• The more exposed is the portfolio to unanticipated interest-rate movement;
• The more volatile we can expect the portfolio interest cost to be (locked-in interest costs are, by nature, not volatile over time);
• The larger tail measures such as Cost-at-Risk should be (again because the portfolio is more exposed to unanticipated spikes in interest rates, to tails in their distribution);
• The larger the bill issue sizes are (more bills is part and parcel of what creates high rollover).
The yearly rollover amount is therefore a simple and useful risk proxy. It is calculable in the asymptotic steady-state setup described above. This quantity RR t , representing the percent of portfolio in year t that matures by t + 1, is shown in Appendix A.3 to approach a constant limit:
where the weights w j are as defined in (4.1), and
As with W AC * , the measure RR * = RR * (f ; g) gauges the long-term, asymptotic, steady-state implication of using issuance strategy f , but for risk. Namely, using f indefinitely can be expected to create a portfolio of which the fraction RR * must be rolled yearly. Higher RR * indicates higher risk; this is our risk proxy metric.
Frontier
A natural question at this point is which strategies comprise the efficient frontier under these cost and risk metrics. In Appendix A.4 we show that under certain regularity conditions on r, when the required risk level is fixed at some given level τ j (i.e. the constraint RR * ≤ R is imposed for R := τ j ), the strategy that minimizes the cost measure t W AC is issuance concentrated on the single tenor
When R is not of the form τ j for integer j, but lies in between τ j and τ j+1 , then the lowest-cost strategy is an appropriate blend of issuance at tenors j and j + 1. So in effect, for any level of risk R these metrics imply there is a "sweet spot" tenor given by the formula j * (R) around which a concentrated-issuance strategy is the cost-dominant one for risk = R. This tenor is illustrated in Figure 5 for several choices of g. Note in the limit as g → 0 this optimal tenor is simply j = 1/R (see solid curve in Figure 5 ). Stated conversely, when g = 0 the "risk" of j-year issuance using our metric is just RR * (g = 0) = 1/j, recovering the intuitive notion that a j-year issuance strategy creates a portfolio of which roughly 1/j is rolled yearly. Indeed, [17] proposes a risk proxy based on assigning weight 1/j to j−period borrowing. By using the metric RR * as risk proxy, we are able to make the appropriate and growth-adjusted generalization of that simple intuition to arbitrary new-issuance strategies f .
Long-term deficit and rate assumptions
The metrics described above depend on deficit-growth and interest rate assumption parameters. For our purposes it is best to calibrate these to longer-term averages that can serve as a plausible description of asymptotic behavior. Figure 5 : "Sweet-spot" tenor vs. rollover (RR * ) constraint. Single-issuance strategy at the given tenor (or if not possible, a blend of nearby tenors) dominates other issuance strategies f with the same RR * (f ). Frontier is shown for g = 0, 4, 8, 12%; higher values of g reduce the risk-mitigation created by longer-tenor issuance, because faster deficit-growth reduces the relative importance of long-past issuance to the portfolio, making shorter tenors more efficient.
For rates we can use, for example, a simple average of history rates (see Table 1 ). Such a yield curve is wider than the current market environment as of 2017, so it embeds an assumption that some reversion to the mean or normalizing will have taken place in the long-term. Internal calculations use a set of long-term forward rate assumptions produced by OMB as part of its budget process. For deficits we observe the log-linear trend of deficit growth over several historical decades (post-1970, when primary deficits began to be the norm) to be roughly g = 8%, so that is our base case choice. See Figure 6 . Because the intent is to be parsimonious and represent average dynamics rather than to overfit to any particular rate or deficit scenario, the hope is that results are not overly sensitive to these choices. A natural question therefore is how our proxy metrics vary with the rate and deficit assumptions behind them. Obviously t W AC is unaffected by the particular choice of r, by design. W AC * = w j r j depends in a linear way on r; tilting r wider and steeper would increase W AC * (and conversely for tighter/flatter), but in a somewhat uniform way. That is, when comparing two strategies in terms of W AC * , simple shifts or rescalings of r (within plausible limits) will tend not to materially alter the relative cost relationship between them.
The effect of the deficit growth assumption g = 8% may appear more ambiguous. Generally, for a given strategy f , increasing the assumed g will increase its computed cost (t W AC ) but decrease its computed risk (RR * ). Figure 5 shows the effect of these shifts for various choices of g on frontier (concentrated-issuance) strategies. As with rates, such a shift in g within a plausible range of 4 − 12% appears unlikely to materially alter conclusions drawn regarding the relative cost/risk relationship between two sufficiently-distinct strategies.
As stated in Appendix A.1, there is also a technical requirement, for our simple construction to lead to the explicit analytical formulas described above, that g > W AC * . (Otherwise the equilibrium W AC * can only be calculated implicitly.) This does not appear to be overly restrictive; as shown in Figure 7 , using a simple estimate of the effective WAC (adjusting the WAC of couponbearing securities by the 6m bill yield × the bill fraction of the portfolio) we see that only in the early 1980s Volcker era did the effective-WAC exceed 8%. (Note, this was also a period when deficit growth was far higher than 8% per year.) The average is closer to 6% and the recent trend has been under 2%. All indications are that deficit-driven rather than interest-driven debt growth is the asymptotic behavior that is relevant. It is also worth acknowledging that our calculations are in strict nominal terms and based on the simple mechanical mathematics of debt-rolling. In so doing we knowingly leave considerations such as the debt-to-GDP ratio and the intertemporal budget constraint, transversality conditions, and/or sustainability considerations (see, for example, [14] ) aside. As well, apparently the oft-cited correlation or feedback between issuance, interest rates, and fiscal needs as in the tax-smoothing and Ramsey planning literature (cf. [15] , [5] , [9] ) is omitted here.
6 Mapping strategy to cost-risk space
We have described how a set of issuance fractions f can, under simple assumptions about deficits and rates, be mapped into cost-versus-risk space. There are several alternatives described above (depending on the level of exactness or abstraction desired):
Summarize this abstractly by stipulating that to each set of fractions f we form the mapping
where R is the risk-proxy metric and C the cost-proxy chosen. (In what follows, unless otherwise stated we use C = t W AC .)
To illustrate this mapping, when f = e j (i.e. concentrated regular issuance only at tenor j), this mapping becomes f = e j → (τ j , j)
The j = 1 strategy maps to (R = 100%, C = 1), low cost but high risk. The j = 30 strategy maps (with g = 8%) to (R = 0.88%, C = 30), high cost but low risk. Other examples of this mapping and its dependence on g for single-tenor strategies f = e j are shown in Table 2 , which also highlights the dependence on g, especially for longer tenors. (This also helps illustrate why we did not ignore deficit-growth in our construct, or use the naive rollover metric obtained by simply taking τ j = 1/j.) Note that in this reductive case, the choice of r plays little meaningful role, as long as r is monotone increasing (as would be the case for any plausible long-term asymptotic rate assumption). This is because using C = W AC * we just have W AC * = r j . Since r j is monotone-increasing in j, the two proxies are equivalent in the sense of sorting single-tenor strategies by relative cost (i.e., r j > r k ⇐⇒ j > k for all j, k). Table 2 : Examples of the mapping f → (R, C) where f represents a single-tenor issuance strategy at tenor j = 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 30. The cost proxy C = t W AC for this case reduces to C = j. (If C = W AC * is used instead, then we would just have C = r j , which for monotone increasing rates r would not alter the relative cost picture.) The risk proxy R depends on the deficit-growth assumption g: faster deficit growth implies less relative rollover contribution from long-past issuance of longer tenors. Real-world issuance strategies are of course not usually concentrated on single tenors, as for various reasons Treasury can be seen to issue regularly across the yield curve. But what this method allows is to place any nontrivial issuance pattern f into (R, C) space in a way that remains consistent with simple intuition about the tradeoffs between cost and risk in the singletenor thought experiment. Applications of this principle are demonstrated in the next section.
Usage and results
In this section we describe how the proxy metrics described above are used to illustrate and visualize debt issuance strategy. All projected quantities are hypothetical and for illustrative purposes only.
Summarizing historical issuance strategy
How can these metrics, which by construction relate to asymptotic portfolio behavior, be applied to actual Treasury debt issuance? It can be observed historically that Treasury does not evidently select and then use indefinitely a single set of fractions f for its issuance pattern. Instead, the issuance pattern can only be observed empirically, as a consequence of Treasury decisions and events. Nor does the asymptotic portfolio ever actually emerge, as fiscal, market and (indeed) debt management strategy may evolve and fluctuate.
But for historical issuance we can still analyze issue fractions a posteriori: aggregate all issuance within a fiscal year and observe the empirical issuance fractions that were used, by setting
where here A j represents the amount issued in tenor bucket j, and A represents total issuance, during the year. (Note that bills that were issued and matured prior to the end of the fiscal year are not counted in A t , since it is meant to reflect net borrowing required to finance D t + I t + M t .) Table 3 shows how this calculation applies to summarizing Treasury issuance during fiscal-year 2016. 
Empirical Issuance Fractions (FY2016)
Tenor (y) Security Type Notional ($bn) Flow Issuance Fraction We can thus create this mapping in each historical year t:
In so doing we are summarizing a year's issuance pattern by mapping it to the asymptotic properties of the portfolio it would create if continued indefinitely. The table presented in Figure 8 summarizes this calculation when applied to 2016 issuance in fractional form. shown for FY2016 issuance summarized as empirical new-issue fractions, and using a long-term rate assumption derived from post-1980 historical-averages. Risk (RR * ) and Cost (W AC * ) proxies shown for three deficit growth assumptions, g = 4, 8, 12%. Using base-case g = 8%, the method summarizes 2016 issuance as having selected (R, C) = (25.3%, 4.39%) in cost-versus-risk space. Average new-issue maturity was around four years (N W AM = 49 months), but t W AC = 10 implies that under this issuance pattern it is the ∼ 10-year interest rate behavior/assumption that will be of most importance to longer-term portfolio interest cost when issuing using this allocation.
Treasury issuance strategy from fiscal years 1981-2016 is summarized and portrayed in Figure 9 (using g = 8%) with this technique. The approach serves to highlight outlier years: 2015 was an especially long-biased issuance pattern; 2001-2002 were short-biased years (in large part due to the discontinuation of 30-year bond issuance).
We see that current Treasury issuance (FY2016) has pulled back somewhat from its recent long bias. This is presumably a partial consequence of the mid-2015 decision 2 to increase bills stock, but also of the February 2016 decision 3 to reduce issue sizes of 5y and longer notes/bonds/TIPS. Figure 10 portrays the same diagram but using t W AC rather than W AC * as cost proxy. This transforms and stretches the diagram, but does not appear to materially alter the relative relationships between yearly strategies, or outliers. This should be unsurprising given the fact that r is monotone-increasing (as would be any plausible long-term asymptotic interest-rate assumption).
Figures 11-12 replicate these diagrams but using g = 4% rather than 8%. We see that although the quantities change, relative relationships among yearly strategies are largely (albeit not entirely) robust to changes in the long-term deficit-growth assumption. 
Spot issuance strategy
Rather than the a posteriori empirical analysis of the previous section, we can gauge the current stance of issuance strategy by using prevailing issuance sizes (rather than rolled-up issuance throughout a year) to infer the new-issue fractions f that they imply.
For example, the current size of a new-issue 30-year bond (as of 2017) is $15 billion, a new CUSIP is issued four times per year, and each is reopened twice in amounts of $12 billion. Under such a policy, the implied yearly flow of 30-year issuance is 4(15 + 12 + 12) = $156 billion. We calculate the flow for all other tenors in the same manner, and from those, the implied fractions f these sizes represent. This is illustrated in Figure 13 for issuance sizes prevailing as of end Q3 2017. (As a technical note: when doing this for bills we use yearly-averaged bill sizes rather than current bill sizes, because bill issuance fluctuates throughout the year due to their role as fiscal shock-absorber. Since our goal is to infer the stance of issuance strategy we need to eliminate this exogenous seasonality effect.)
Spot strategies are calculated monthly in this manner from 1992-present (see Figure 14 ). The joint evolution is portrayed in Figure 15 as a trajectory on an (R, C) diagram. They are also broken out into individual periods in Figure 16 . Several apparently distinct periods of Treasury issuance policy can be tracked on these illustrations:
• Reduced term borrowing from falling deficits in 1990s • Lengthening of issuance allocation post-financial crisis What is perhaps most salient here, in the final graph of Figure 16 , is the clustering of policy points (green, upper left) that is seen from June 2010 -October 2015. This is the post-financial-crisis period of actively extending WAM, i.e., of employing a relatively static new issuance flow strategy with a long bias. The graph also shows that policy has begun to shorten modestly since, with the early 2016 reductions in all 5+ year issuance sizes.
Applying (R, C) metrics to spot-issuance patterns allows one to illustrate and visualize the path and direction of Treasury issuance in a way that lines up with how debt management is most directly announced and affected: by considering and/or making specific changes to issue sizes, by introducing or removing tenors, by changing auction schedules -by altering Treasury flow. Key historical decisions about Treasury issuance become plainly visible as movement in (R, C) space. Conversely, periods such as 2011-16 in which (we assert) issuance strategy was effectively unchanged emerge as periods of little or no such movement. Note that in such periods of static issuance-strategy, WAM may be changing rapidly, which again highlights the distorted picture that can be painted by WAM.
Visualizing forward scenarios
Another benefit of mapping issuance to our representative (R, C) metrics is that one can visualize the direction and effect of potential forward strategy options in a simple, intuitive way that escapes the need to examine dozens or hundreds of individual, projected future issue sizes.
For example, suppose financing needs are due to increase, and Treasury considers one of three strategy options in response:
• Increase only bill sizes incrementally as needed; leave all other sizes unchanged • A shorter-tenor strategy preferentially favoring increases to bills, 2-3y notes, and the 2y floating rate note
• Keep bill, TIPS and FRN sizes constant, and increase the coupon stack pro rata as needed In Figure 17 each of these three strategy approaches have been simulated for ten years under hypothetical rate and deficit assumptions, and the issue-size-implied allocations plotted as trajectories on the (R, C) diagram. The different cost and risk implications of each of the strategy options become evident. Portraying strategies in this way can help the policy maker understand the implications of and relationships between the cost-risk tradeoffs involved in strategy alternatives.
Constrained scenarios
The idealized efficient frontier mentioned above in (R, C) space will typically consist of singletenor issuance at some optimal tenor. Obviously this is not realistic, practical, or even desirable: Treasury has a long-established policy of issuing and maintaining many liquid benchmarks across the yield curve. There are other factors that can motivate against the literal interpretation of the concentrated issuance as optimal: the model omits feedback between issuances and rates, for example. For all intents, a concentrated issuance strategy f = e j would be considered inadmissible as a strategy option. This raises the point that strategies must belong to the admissible set of strategies in order to be legitimately considered as potential allocation adjustments.
Defining admissible strategies is ultimately the province of the debt manager; the process and considerations behind it are beyond the scope of this piece. But the effect of constraints -the debt manager's "policy window" of admissible strategies -on the analysis above, modifies the framework only slightly. A common approach may be to define lower and upper bounds L and U for the new-issuance allocations (or equivalently, upper bounds on changes from the current allocation f curr ); this defines the admissible set to be strategies such that L ≤ f ≤ U . Each such strategy has a point on the (R, C) diagram, and it is straightforward to identify dominant directions that reduce cost or risk (see Appendix A.5). This idea is depicted in Figure 18 .
These dominant and constrained-optimal strategy directions could be used to inform policy decisions as to how to adjust borrowing patterns in the face of anticipated changes in financing Figure 18 : Schematic illustration of issuance strategies constrained to a "policy window" (admissible set) of allowed strategies, mapped to an (R, C) diagram. Cost-and risk-dominant strategy directions from the current issuance pattern f curr , as well as the optimal strategy within the admissible set (generally a simplex, for simple linear constraints), are easily calculated.
requirements. For example, if deficits are anticipated to rise (creating a "funding gap" if current issue-size flow were maintained), borrowing at which tenor(s) should be increased in order to close the gap? Different choices of tenor(s) imply different new-issue allocations f , which can be evaluated in terms of how they alter the cost and risk proxy metrics described above.
Summary
We introduce simple cost and risk proxy metrics that can be attached to empirical Treasury issuance, to "spot" issuance patterns, and/or to forward issuance scenarios over time. These metrics are based on mapping issuance fractions to their long-term, asymptotic portfolio implications for cost (C) and risk (R) under mechanical debt-rolling dynamics, and given simple but necessary assumptions about asymptotic deficit growth and interest rates.
Mapping strategies to the resulting (R, C) diagram enables one to harness the intuitions of standard portfolio theory, including the efficient frontier, which in this simple construct can be calculated analytically as an optimal single-tenor issuance strategy corresponding to a given risk tolerance.
Comparing historical or future issuance to the frontier and to past issuance enables policy makers to understand the direction and implication of the issuance decisions and implied tradeoffs they make in a way that is more dynamic and flow-centered than the traditional portfolio metric (WAM). As such these metrics are a valuable tool in discussing and understanding Treasury debt management.
Although the recursion model used to derive these metrics is clearly reductive, there is scope to expand on the work by, for example, endowing it with rate and deficit paths that are stochastic, mean-reverting, and correlated. Ultimately the steady W AC * and rollover-fraction RR * that we derive under our simple steady recursion model may be understood to represent -under appropriate assumptions -a special case of the stochastic equilibrium portfolio of a more complex and market-realistic model. Another potential area of refinement is to model the dynamics of inflation-linked (TIPS) and floating-rate (FRNs) debt rather than binning them with nominal counterparts.
While work is ongoing, we hasten to add that in bridging the gap between debt management modeling and practice model complexity and (often illusory) macroeconomic completeness ought not be impediments to intuitive metrics that can aid consideration and communication of debt management strategy -and, which are aligned with the considerations of debt management as it is implemented. of current-tenor stock j + 1 from the previous year, and new-issuance at tenor j in the current year. This implies a recurrence for Q t :
where S is a shift operator (S ij = δ j,i+1 ). Notice that the maturing amount M t is simply
where we have used expression A.8 for a s and A.3 for z t . Expression (A.6) becomes
